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What is realised here is a power that comes from beyond or before the conscious 
will, from a nature or an affect that is impersonal, preindividual, and complicit with 
chance. Ramey (2012: 162) 
 
If thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who possesses a method 
than that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps. 
Deleuze & Guattari (1994: 55) 
 
Abstract 
 
The article proposes divination as a speculative method for inquiry, drawing primarily on the 
work of Deleuze. Divinatory practices would be diagrammatic, ambulant, cryptic, affirmative 
and experimental. They would look for strange relations between the one and the many, in 
the shifting totality of the cosmos, and entertain relations that are always to some extent 
inhuman. The article offers an example from an ethnographic study of classroom 
interaction. It suggests that divination has the power to import “catastrophe” into the 
frameworks and methods of research, in the hope of clearing a space for creativity and 
unforeseen outcomes.    
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hermetic philosophy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the ontological and posthuman ‘turns’ that have agitated qualitative research, there is a 
need for new methodologies fit for sensing the forces and intensities of immanent 
participation and more-than-human relationality. I propose divination as a speculative 
method, drawing on the half-submerged presence of occult and esoteric thought in the 
work of Deleuze. I will argue that it is in esoteric knowledge and practice that we might find 
what immanent inquiry needs in order to escape anthropocentrism and the transcendental 
relations of categorical reason, with its dualities of mind and matter, general and particular, 
global and local. In contrast to these constrained relations, divination discerns stranger 
affinities and more baroque forms of participation of the one in the many, and the many in 
the one. The contours of these relations may be sensed, but can never be fully 
comprehended or represented, as they are constantly re-formed by the movements and 
forces that constitute them. Such an inquiry would entertain unpredictable alliances and 
“unnatural nuptials” among heterogeneous participants, human and nonhuman (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987: 242). What would formerly have been understood as data analysis would 
become something more like a Deleuzian (2000: 5) “apprenticeship to signs”: a matter of 
cryptic encounters with the enigmatic surplus that inheres in signs and events. Divination 
would demand techniques that are symbolic, intensive and diagrammatic – ways of reading 
the world and tapping into the forces that compose events in order to unfold their 
ramifications, and draw lines from the known to the unknown (Deleuze, 2003).  Toward the 
end of the article I offer a small example of what divinatory practice might look like, and 
explore some implications for educational and social research. 
 
Occult practices as the “dark precursors” of philosophies of immanence 
 
Perhaps it is not surprising that immanent ontologies present a challenge for research 
methodology. Deleuze lamented that philosophy itself had yet to achieve the creative 
complicity of life and thought that immanence demands. Philosophy was failing to grasp the 
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dynamic unity in which thought marks life and life activates thought, leaving instead only 
the choice “between mediocre lives and mad thinkers” (Deleuze, 2005: 67). We are still 
waiting, Deleuze asserted, for that “fine unity” of mad thought and wild life, in which 
neither consumes or diminishes the other, but instead urges the other on, in the enjoyment 
of a kind of Nietzschean rude health. In the same way, I would argue that immanence has 
yet to fully infiltrate the conceptual architecture and the methodic practices of social 
inquiry.  
 
I consider divination in this article alongside other pre-scientific or hermetic practices – 
magic, shamanism, sorcery, witchcraft, alchemy. These somewhat disreputable practices 
have been engaged in recent years by philosophers and theorists interested in the 
productive force of the “chaos of potentials” (Stivale, 2008: 20) that precede and exceed 
reason.1 Taking the Deleuzian oeuvre alone: divination, sorcery and witchcraft manifest at 
various points, together with ‘cosmic artisans’ such as Messaien, Bacon, Beckett and other 
diviners of high modernity who dare to wrangle the forces of the cosmos. Animal relations 
offer alternatives to the structure of “filiation” that hampers thought and arrests the 
movements of difference. Dionysus, the Greek God of wine and altered states, appears as 
the creative excess of intoxication and cruelty that lurks in the interstices of 
representation.2 Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 247) propose a minoritarian ‘politics of 
sorcery’ whose potential has been fleshed out by later writers seeking resources to combat 
capitalism’s own dark arts (Pignarre & Stengers, 2011; Ramey, 2010; 2016). These 
appearances of the occult in Deleuze’s work are often fleeting or allusive. Nevertheless, 
according to Joshua Ramey, whose work informs this article, they testify to “a kind of secret 
priority or silent prerogative given to esoteric knowledge and practice as a clue to the 
multiple meanings of immanence” (2012: 103). 
 
Occult practices can be understood as belonging to a deviated, meandering philosophical 
line identified by many scholars - a tangled and broken line to be sure, but one that errantly 
connects the ancient Stoics, Giordano Bruno, Nicholas da Cusa, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Nietzsche, 
Tarde, Bergson, Pierce, Whitehead, Simondon, Ruyer and of course Deleuze. The occult 
influences that Ramey discerns in this ‘minor’ line inside twentieth century philosophy 
interrelate by ramification and intensification rather than Platonic descent: they express, he 
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argues, “a kind of eclectic, bastard and nomadic spirituality, one without pure origin or 
urtext, situated at the crossroads of competing civilizations and conflicting orthodoxies” 
(2012: 5). Elizabeth Grosz engages several of these thinkers in her recent corrective to 
contemporary materialisms that have, in her view, forgotten matter’s debt to the vital 
forces of ideality. She equates ideality to “a kind of magical or religious thinking that seeks 
the orders of connection that regulate the universe itself” (2017: 12) and commends 
Nietzsche’s challenge to science: “Do you really believe that the sciences would ever have 
originated and grown if the way had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, 
astrologers, and witches whose promises and pretensions first had to create a thirst, a 
hunger, a taste for the hidden and forbidden powers?” (Nietzsche, quoted in Grosz, 2017, 
104; emphasis retained). Ramey (2012: 37) identifies pre-modern thinkers of immanence, 
such as Nicola da Cusa and Giordano Bruno, as “dark precursors” of speculative philosophy, 
and outlines the transformation of thought that hermeticism both demands and 
effectuates: 
 
For both Deleuze and the hermetic tradition generally, certain intense, mantic, 
initiatory, ascetic, and transformative practices are necessary for thought as much as 
for meditational or visionary experience. Conversely, for both Deleuze and 
hermeticism, authentic thought is identified, beyond mere accumulation of 
cognitions, with an expansion of the mind’s ability to endure the intense modes of 
perception and communication necessary for psychic reintegration and cosmic 
renewal. Thought in this way might be defined... as a regenerative principle of 
natural and social development. (Ramey, 2012: 5) 
 
Ramey argues that hermeticism has played a major, if covert, contribution to “experimental 
immanence as a theme in modern philosophy” (29; emphasis added).  
 
There is also a distinct tinge of occult practice in Deleuze’s account of the interpretation of 
signs. Signs for Deleuze are enigmatic reserves of hidden forces; they “testify to the spiritual 
and natural powers which act beneath the words, gestures, characters and objects 
represented” (1994: 23). To interpret signs is to cultivate a creative response to these 
hidden forces. Signs may be material or incorporeal, as well as linguistic, and are important 
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not for what they signify or communicate, but for their potential to enter into relations with 
other signs, and thereby rouse the mind to new connections. The interpretation of signs 
requires skills of deciphering and divination. “We must be Egyptologists”, Deleuze asserts in 
his analysis of the operation of signs in Proust’s writing. He continues: 
 
For there are no mechanical laws between things or voluntary communications 
between minds. Everything is implicated, everything is complicated, everything is 
sign, meaning, essence. Everything exists in those obscure zones that we penetrate 
as into crypts, in order to decipher glyphs and secret languages. The Egyptologist, in 
all things, is the man [sic] who undergoes an initiation – the apprentice” (Deleuze, 
2000: 92).  
 
I will argue that interpretation in qualitative inquiry can be reconceptualized as just such an 
“apprenticeship to signs” (Deleuze, 2000: 5; emphasis added), shaped through cryptic 
encounter with the enigmatic surplus that subsists in the “obscure zones” within 
educational and social events.  
 
There are dangers of reductionism and colonialism in moving, as this article does, among 
and across different esoteric practices. Systems of magic, sorcery and divination are 
culturally and historically specific: their efficacy issues from the shared spiritual, political, 
affective, and ethical charge that they hold for the groups who fabricate them.3 Divinatory 
practices for educational and social research must not be opportunistically stripped from 
the specific belief systems and realities of other cultures and eras, as assets for 
reinvigorating the waning efficacy of scientific rationality, in a repetition of colonial 
predation. The Egyptologist, it must be admitted, is a far from innocent figure in the history 
of Western imperialism, and it would be only too easy for our cryptic encounters to degrade 
into grave robbing. Inquiry needs to be mindful of the threat that Western fascination with 
indigenous and subaltern cultures has always posed to those who have become the objects 
of its attentions, and its good intentions (Greenblatt, 1991). Inquiry must develop its own 
pragmatic arts and fashion its own situated practices – ways of thinking and of reading the 
world that are grounded in the specific milieu of social research, and the problems 
addressed by those involved (Stengers, 2008). I return to these issues later in this article.  
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Such techniques are always going to involve a combination of uncertainty, caution and risk.  
Ramey (2012: 175) notes that magic is predominantly a “tentative, ambulant and 
experimental enterprise”. Immanent thought, like magic, may well discharge itself in the 
flash of instantaneous revelation, horror or transformation, but it accrues, as noted, from a 
long apprenticeship in the reading of signs and the development of faculties of 
discrimination. Practitioners must learn to test and “taste” the likely effects of an 
intervention that could be toxic at the wrong dosage (Stengers, 2008). Immanent thought 
accordingly involves “a sort of groping experimentation” according to Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994: 41), carried out nevertheless according to measures that are not sober or rational, 
but “belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, 
drunkenness, and excess”. It is in this respect that, in their famous phrase, “To think is 
always to follow the witch’s flight” (41, emphasis added). 
 
 
Witchcraft and sorcery in/as inquiry 
 
Witches and sorcerers “haunt the fringes” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 244). They occupy 
the liminal position of the ‘Anomalous’ in their societies, living at the borderlines of their 
territory, at the edges of the woods or the outskirts of their villages. They have an “affinity 
for alliance” with animal and demonic entities that are themselves anomalous 
intermediaries. This alliance with the anomalous allows the sorcerer to gain inhuman 
knowledge and power. Deleuze and Guattari counterpose the relationality of alliance, 
typical of social formations such as packs and bands, to that of filiation, whose straight lines 
of heredity and hierarchy govern familial and State relations. Alliances form through modes 
of affective complicity that are indifferent to the bonds of family resemblance and filial 
obligation, and are more like contagion and epidemic: 
 
... contagion, epidemic involves terms that are entirely heterogeneous: for example, 
a human being, an animal, and a bacterium, a virus, a molecule, a microorganism. Or 
in the case of the truffle, a tree, a fly, and a pig. These combinations are neither 
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genetic nor structural; they are interkingdoms, unnatural participations. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 242) 
 
Despite holding an anomalous position with respect to the laws and conventions of civilised 
society, the sorcerer is not, however, a social isolate. Sorcerers are intensely sensitive to the 
clandestine forces that act upon humans, and connect them with non-humans in “dark 
assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 242). Ramey (2012: 64) goes so far as to suggest 
that sorcery offers “a model of what all human life might be, beyond the entrapments of the 
traditional human essence”. Skonieczny (2017) explores the possibility of a minoritarian 
politics of sorcery for contemporary political and economic conditions, and finds 
revolutionary potential in the conceptual persona of the sorcerer. He writes: “The sorcerer 
is thus a finely-tuned receiving device, who … can attune him- or herself to something which 
is “not yet conscious” for society as a whole, and yet permeates it and pushes from 
underneath.” (Skonieczny 2017: 976). This persona - though it would always be at risk of 
collapsing into the empty posturing of bravado – has a certain appeal for those of us who 
would still call themselves social and educational researchers, however mutated the 
subjectivities and the inhuman alliances of researchers would necessarily become.  
 
 
Divination and the diagram 
 
Turning to divination: for Deleuze, divination is central to the ethics of the event. In Logic of 
Sense, working from Stoic philosophy, Deleuze (2004) proposes divination as a mode of 
creative and ethical encounter with events through the affirmation of chance. This would be 
a kind of speculative or future-oriented interpretation that works the chance and alterity 
that attend events in order to open thought and action to new directions and connections. 
The logic of the event demands engagement not with what actually occurs, but with 
“something in that which occurs, something yet to come which would be consistent with 
what occurs, in accordance with the laws of an obscure, humorous conformity: the Event” 
(Deleuze, 2004, 149, emphasis added). Divination attempts to access the incorporeal and 
unrepresentable sense that subsists in/as virtual events, in order to counter-actualize or 
creatively replay it. As Ramey (2012: 173) writes, counter-actualization is not a matter of 
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reacting to events but of ramifying them, “extending their implications to unusual or 
unforeseeable conclusions, carrying lines of sense farther than they are intended to reach. 
To counter-actualize is to replay, and in some sense outplay, the drama of events 
themselves”.  
 
In affirming chance, divination attempts to clear the space of creation from the ‘givens’ that 
return thought to cliché and impede the ramifying of events into as-yet-unknown territory. 
Deleuze, in his engagement with the work of Francis Bacon, states that the challenge for the 
modern painter, and indeed for modern thought in general, is to escape or at least pervert 
those givens that always already envelop us:  
 
the painter is already in the canvas, where he or she encounters all the figurative 
and probablilistic givens that occupy and preoccupy the canvas. An entire battle 
takes place on the canvas between the painter and these givens. There is thus a 
preparatory work that belongs to painting fully, and yet precedes the act of 
painting.... This preparatory work is silent and invisible, yet extremely intense, and 
the act of painting itself appears as an afterward ... in relation to this work. (Deleuze, 
2003: 99; original emphasis) 
 
The battle with the givens, in Bacon’s work, is engaged via “aleatory marks” or “asignifying 
traits” (2003: 100) – random or accidental strokes, smudges or deformations of the paint, 
around which, and from which, the painting emerges in chancy ways that cannot be 
anticipated at the outset. The aleatory mark undermines the orders of figuration and 
representation, releasing the work from conventional meaning, and circumventing the will 
of the artist. “It is as if the hand assumed an independence and began to be guided by other 
forces”, Deleuze writes. “The painter’s hand intervenes in order to shake its own 
dependence and break up the sovereign optical organization: one can no longer see 
anything, as if in a catastrophe, a chaos” (100-101).  
 
This is the operation of the diagram – to introduce “catastrophe” into the static, vertical 
relations of signification and figuration. The diagram “unlocks areas of sensation” (102) and 
imports a presentiment or “germ” of a new rhythm or organisation. When it succeeds, and 
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this is by no means assured, the diagram reaches beyond itself and brings new things into 
view. Gangle observes that the diagram “pre-creates” the painting, by setting up particular 
conditions for the operation of chance:   
 
The function of the painterly diagram is to "cast" a concrete, aleatoric structure that 
may or may not contribute finally to the finished composition of the actual work but 
the mutual determinations of whose elements provide virtual conditions or openings 
for its creative production. The diagram does not directly determine the work, but 
conditions the process of its creation. The role of the diagram is thus that of a 
seemingly paradoxical kind of mediation, one which "mediates" a radically 
unforeseeable and indeterminable creative act. (Gangle, 2010:  80) 
 
The diagram is thus, in the words of Bogue and Semetsky (2010: 116) “a map which 
engenders the territory to which it is supposed to refer.” Gangle argues that the diagram 
applies not only to art, but to all modes of creation: “Creation in Deleuze is always (not only 
in the study of Bacon but throughout his entire philosophy) a matter of initially 
diagrammatic and machinic preparation. (2010: 80-81).” 
 
Doing inquiry diagrammatically might therefore involve constructing little aleatory machines 
designed to import “catastrophe” into the frameworks and methods of research, policy and 
practice, in order to clear a space for creativity and unforeseen outcomes. Examples of such 
work already exist. De Freitas (2012: 557) for instance explores the potential of diagrams as 
a “creative force” in research on classroom interaction. She uses mathematical knot 
diagrams as an a-signifying technique for disrupting conventional models of interaction to 
reveal lines of flight and rhizomatic complexities. Renold and Ivinson (2019), in their 
collaborations with young people living with transgenerational trauma and extreme 
poverty, collaboratively craft artefacts that condense the “residues and intensities” of the 
young people’s experience. In turn these artefacts, heavy with symbolic intensity and 
diagrammatic potential, are inserted into public and political spaces to effect small 
catastrophes. For instance, an artfully mutated chair, expressing girls’ experience of sexual 
violence, has appeared on the platform as a mute attendant in policy seminars and 
government health initiatives. My own previous work has attempted to incorporate a-
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signifying traits into research method by attending to the ‘disconcerting’ power of that 
which lies on the borderlines of language and body, and resists representation or capture by 
coding – such as laughter, cries, refrains, tears, snot, vomiting, lies and jokes (MacLure, 
2011; 2013b; 2016). 
 
It is also important to note that divination depends on careful preparation. The effort of 
“clearing” the canvas in order to open it, and oneself, to the vicissitudes of chance depends, 
as Deleuze noted in the quotation above, on preparation that is “silent and invisible, yet 
extremely intense” (2003: 99). The work of divination demands a certain rigor and 
“sobriety” (Deleuze, 2005: 344). It is not a matter of unlicensed, free-floating interpretation, 
and is far from the “pseudotransgressive sensationalism of solitary genius” (Ramey, 2012: 
201). That is why, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the child and the madman are 
not eligible as “cosmic artisans”: although they may have the agility to evade capture by 
convention, and the inclination to entertain inhuman alliances, they lack the solemn resolve 
necessary for the serious play of rigorous experimentation.  
 
Inquiry as divination, though it may be invigorated by the prephilosophical practices of art, 
is not therefore a matter of open-ended imaginative play, or a willingness to “go with the 
flow” of immersive experience. For some, it may involve preparatory exercises specifically 
designed to loosen the hold of reason and common sense, in order to open up mind and 
body to new affects. Renold and Ivinson (2019) for instance, subject themselves and their 
coparticipants to taxing (though enjoyable) outdoor adventures as bodily and affective 
preparation for their collaborative “artful interventions”. Walking has become popular as a 
dynamic substrate for speculative methodologies (Springgay & Truman, 2018). Cull (2011) 
proposes “attention training exercises” devised, again, to bypass the stale conventions of 
spectatorship and the conscious will in order to allow new forms of immanent, “ontological 
participation.” Whether done via explicit exercises of mind or body, or less visibly, divination 
arguably always involves some form of “attention training” or re-training. This will inevitably 
demand some form of extended encounter or apprenticeship, as argued above. This may be 
served as the longueurs of time spent trying to clear the canvas of qualitative method in 
order decipher the signs of data differently (see below). It may also accrue from deep bonds 
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of alliance forged over time as part of a community that is trying and testing its own 
‘fabrications’ (Stengers, 2008).  
 
 
Divination in/as educational and social research 
 
I have suggested that something akin to divinatory interpretation could ethically be put to 
work in and as research. Should we therefore be thinking about methods for divination? A 
textbook for sorcerers’ apprentices? Taken as a set of general prescriptions, methods, as 
others have argued, kill the immersive, experimental character of ontological or “post 
qualitative” inquiry (St. Pierre, 2019; Jackson, 2017). They would ground the “witch’s line” 
(Deleuze, 1997: 109). If we are to have methods, they would need, as argued above, to be 
bespoke ones – crafted to follow the specific grain and contour of the problem in hand, with 
a chancy, yet unbreakable relation to the hoped-for outcome. We would need, on the one 
hand, to pay careful and respectful attention to the complex forces in the event that is 
coming into existence, and on the other to be prepared to make the unwarranted leap 
toward an unpredictable landing.  
 
Qualitative researchers may actually be well-placed to perform divinatory interpretation, 
disposed as they already are to move back and forth between the virtual realm of ideas and 
their actualization in what one might, under conditions of mutation or perversion, continue 
to call ‘data’. Perhaps there is something of the Egyptologist or the metallurgist in the 
researcher’s dedication to following the contours of their “materials” in order to arrive at 
new knowledge or prospects for action. Or at least there could be. Bogue, outlining the 
implications for learning of Deleuze’s pedagogy of signs, states that this “entails first a 
critique of codes and conventions, an undoing of orthodox connections, and then a 
reconnection of elements such that the gaps between them generate problems, fields of 
differential relations and singular points” (Bogue, 2008: 15). I would argue that something 
interstitial, unforeseen and indefinable – a sense of the singular and the anomalous – can, if 
we are crafty and careful, emerge from the strange “reconnections” of the singular and the 
connected in qualitative inquiry. From, on the one hand, lengthy, careful immersion in the 
“field”; and on the other, the chance encounter with the coalescence of forces that issue in 
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and as individual examples or events of “data”. These examples lodge themselves in the 
mind, body and memory as (enticing) problems, precisely because they carry presentiments 
of their wider, virtual connectibility, coupled with the intimation of something singular and 
irreducible, that is exceeding the ambit of conventional method (cf MacLure, 2013a).  
  
Even that most disparaged of methods, coding, can be seen in mutation as potentially 
divinatory and event-ful. I have previously described research coding thus: 
 
The process of coding is both active and passive – a matter of actively making sense 
yet also of accommodating to something ineffable that is already ‘there’. The 
researcher is at this point a live conduit between the materiality of things, and the 
struggle for concepts, and one’s ‘shared entanglement’ with others, and with the 
uncut and unbounded totality of the data, can be felt (MacLure, 2013a: 174). 
 
I might now read these remarks as auguring a practice akin to sorcery or divination – of 
sensing the anomalous that lurks in the interstices of categories, via the intermediary 
position of the researcher herself as ‘conduit’. 
 
The remarks could also be seen as gesturing towards divinatory interpretation according to 
the Deleuzian semiotics introduced above. The description of the process of coding invokes 
the “apprenticeship to signs”, in its allusion to sensing that which exceeds representation, 
and its suggestion of the transformation of self that is wrought in the cryptic encounter with 
signs. Such an apprenticeship also appears to be implicit in this account of the “slow 
intensity” and the affective charge of coding: 
 
there is languorous pleasure and something resolute in the slow intensity of coding – 
an ethical refusal to take the easy exit to quick judgement, free-floating empathy, or 
illusions of data speaking for itself. More importantly, when practiced unfaithfully, 
without rigid purpose or fixed terminus, the slow work of coding allows something 
other, singular, quick and ineffable to irrupt into the space of analysis. (MacLure, 
2013a: 174)  
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The fragment expresses something of the ordeal of apprenticeship – the slow yet resolute 
dedication to one’s materials (here, the “data”) in the absence of certain outcome, in order 
to release, and endure, the “flash” of the sign, which is nothing more (or less) than the 
differential leap of intensity across “disparates” (Deleuze, 1994: 20). “There is no apprentice 
who is not “the Egyptologist’ of something”, writes Deleuze, connecting this figure to other 
symptomatologists whose vocation also depends on training in sensitivity to the signs 
emitted by the material to which they have dedicated themselves. “One becomes a 
carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by becoming 
sensitive to the signs of disease. Vocation is always predestination with regard to signs. 
Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation 
of signs or hieroglyphs” (Deleuze, 2000: 4). The researcher’s struggle to interpret is not 
dissimilar therefore to the adventures of the apprentice Egyptologist, deciphering the 
hieroglyphics in the “obscure zones” of the crypt. 
 
Above all perhaps, divination involves intensification. Ramey elegantly sums up its 
significance for Deleuze as an enduring preoccupation with the “imperceptible intensity at 
the heart of the empirical”. He elaborates: 
 
Deleuze [attempts to] account for how and why it is that when certain affective 
states reach given thresholds of intensity, the mind is invited to fuse its faculties in 
acts of conjecture that connect otherwise independent circuits of sensation, habit, 
memory and understanding. Natural disasters, important political events, certain 
moments in a love affair, sequences in a film, passages in a piece of music, and many 
other intensities can force sensation, memory and thought to overstep their 
ordinary bounds (Ramey, 2012: 125). 
 
We could think “data” intensively: that is, as miniature natural disasters or moments of 
transport, or indeed catastrophe, where affective intensities incite the mind to contract 
relations that cannot be represented, but allow us to overstep the bounds of the familiar. 
This would require us to go beyond the conventional focus of empirical qualitative research 
on the actual, to engage, or diagram, the virtual forces and intensities of events. The ‘field’ 
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from which ethnographic knowledge has always issued would now also be a transcendental 
field of a-subjective potentials (Deleuze, 2005).   
 
Ramey gives a beautiful example of intensive movement from an early discussion by 
Deleuze of Mallarmé’s poem, Éventail, or Fan. In this poem, it is the closed fan that 
expresses the pure potentiality of intensive movement. The fan’s stillness, Ramey (2012: 93) 
writes, expresses “a kind of involuted or ‘complicated’ infinity” that symbolizes “the 
unlimited density of potential movement” in which “lies the entire mystique of what will 
have occurred with any movement, any gesture”. The poem, then, is a symbol, in the 
Deleuzian, and Proustian sense outlined above. It does not offer explanation, but incites 
thought or action. It is energetic. For Ramey, symbols are, “in some sense, diagrams of 
immanence” (110; emphasis added). 
 
An immanent inquiry might therefore treat data events as symbolic rather than 
representational. Rather than draining examples of their intensity in order to elevate them 
to generality, the aim would be to try to unfold the potentials that they express, in order to 
be opened to new connections. Data would no longer be representations, available to be 
mined for meaning. Instead they would be hieroglyphs, whose sense cannot be separated 
from their appearances.  
 
 
The jump 
 
Divination will always incur the risk of a loss of ontological security, as a result of refusing to 
allow oneself to be removed to a place of safety, somewhere outside of, or above events, 
through dogmatic thinking or the comforts of method. It undermines the conception of 
choice and decision as the simple exercise of the interpreter’s will, and commands 
subjection to the vicissitudes of chance. The researcher, in exercising choice, is 
simultaneously exercised by it, in the manner of Ahab’s “choosing” of Moby Dick as the 
object of his obsession: “a choosing that exceeds him and comes from elsewhere” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987: 244, emphasis added).  
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Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 55) contend, as quoted at the top of this article, that “if 
thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who possesses a method than that of 
a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps.”  Stengers makes a similar assertion, 
albeit in a rather more solemn register. Writing under the influence of William James, 
Stengers states that immanent or speculative practice involves “… a jump that demands 
trust but offers no warrant” (2008, 45). This is unconditional or “precursive” trust. It must 
be exercised in the absence of the usual guarantees afforded by logic, theory, superior 
judgement or common sense. Stengers quotes James’ description of the jump: 
 
We can and we may, as it were, jump with both feet off the ground into or towards a 
world of which we trust the other parts to meet our jump – and only so can the 
making of a perfected world of pluralistic patterns ever take place. Only through our 
precursive trust in it can it come into being.  
(James, W. 1922, quoted in Stengers, 2008: 44; emphasis added) 
 
However, Stengers also insists that the jump with both feet never really leaves the ground 
from which it ventures forth, because it is always situated in a specific encounter or event. 
She elaborates: 
 
the jump is not only toward, … it cannot be dissociated from the ground it leaves. 
You never trust in general and you never jump in general. Any jump is situated, and 
situatedness here is not limitation. If a jump is always situated, it is because its aim is 
not to escape the ground in order to get access to a higher realm. The jump, 
connecting this ground, always this ground, with what it was alien to, 
has the necessity of a response. In other words, the ground must have been 
given the power to make itself felt as calling for new dimensions. 
(Stengers, 2014: 203) 
 
To give the ground the power to make itself felt as “calling” could be understood, in slightly 
different terms, as diagrammatic practice. 
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Triptych 
 
I want to turn now to a specific example from a classroom ethnography that I was involved 
in some years ago. The example includes a data “event” that came to haunt me and my co-
researchers (MacLure et al, 2010), and I have returned to it on subsequent occasions. The 
event concerned a young child, Hannah, who remained silent when her name was called out 
during “registration” period in the classroom. Hannah’s noncompliance seemed to prompt 
an unappeasable rage for explanation from teachers, classmates and parents. As 
researchers we were drawn into that vortex of explanatory insufficiency. We too wanted to 
know why, and who/what to blame. Why are they doing this? Who is to blame? What does 
it mean? Where is it coming from? Who is responsible? How can we fix it? How can we stop 
it? How should we analyse it? Our starting position therefore was one of judgemental 
reason and dogmatic critique (Latour, 2004). We were looking for hostages (Stengers, 2008).  
 
Conventional qualitative approaches would seek the explanation for Hannah’s silence in 
general categories or concepts, such as power, interactional dynamics, family dysfunction, 
autobiographical experience, selective mutism, etc. This was our own initial inclination. But 
we were drawn to the event by the strange force that it seemed to exert: we were unable to 
stand fully outside it, or above it. Yet we were also unable to let go. The example assumed a 
kind of agency: it drew us in. But it also felt portentous – it seemed to point beyond itself, 
towards potential extensions and connections. It seemed to be emitting signs. It felt 
diagrammatic.  
 
So I turn to it again here to try to indicate what could be involved in divinatory or 
diagrammatic practice, involving a symbolic “reading” of data not for the meanings they 
convey but for the unanticipated connections that they afford.4 Rather than looking for 
underlying causes or reasons, the aim would be to try to unfold and follow the hidden 
potentials of the data event. To comprehend a symbol, according to Ramey, “is to be 
compelled to perform the action it prescribes, or at least to find oneself drawn into the 
event it ramifies” (2012: 95). The composition of three fragments below exhibits, I suggest, 
the “uniting-separating” operation of the triptych as described by Deleuze in his analysis of 
Bacon’s paintings, where “the borders of each of the three panels cease to isolate, though 
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they continue to separate and divide” (2003: 108). The three elements of the example 
remain distinct and resistant to incorporation into any over-arching narrative or 
representational schema; yet some obscure “rhythm” runs through them.    
 
Hannah, aged 5, never responds during the morning ritual of taking names for “the 
register”. This silence, the authors write, opens a “hole in the ceremonial order of 
the classroom” (MacLure et al, 2010), into which a deluge of demands for 
explanation pours, as teachers, classmates, parents and researchers are gradually 
drawn into its ambit.  
 
Bartleby the Scrivener, in Melville’s short novel of 1853, does not comply with his 
employer’s instructions but responds with “I would prefer not to”. This “formula”, 
Deleuze (1997: 73) writes, “creates a vacuum within language”, into which a deluge 
of demands for explanation pours, as boss, colleagues, landlord, police and prison 
staff are gradually drawn into its ambit. Bartleby dies in prison, having preferred not 
to eat. 
 
In the video for the indie band Radiohead’s ‘Just’, a man lying in the street refuses to 
say why. His refusal incurs a barrage of demands for explanation from the 
pedestrians and a motor-cycle cop who are successively drawn into its ambit. The 
man finally whispers the secret to the desperate crowd. The camera zooms out to 
reveal all of the participants lying motionless on the ground. 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oIFLtNYI3Ls)  
 
 “Are you not tired of all these explanations?” asks Latour (2004: 229). 
  
The fabrication or assemblage wrought by the three fragments can be understood, I will 
suggest, as a diagrammatic composition as defined by Ramey (2012: 162): “The 
diagrammatic composition is a new being, an assemblage. What is realised here is a power 
that comes from beyond or before the conscious will, from a nature or an affect that is 
impersonal, preindividual, and complicit with chance”. 
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The first fragment, relating to Hannah’s non-compliance is interpreted symbolically: that is, 
as containing, folded within it, hidden intensities that might be unfolded to disclose occult 
meaning or potential. Recalling the quote from Ramey (2012: 125), above, it seemed to 
spark “acts of conjecture that ... force[d] sensation, memory and thought to overstep their 
ordinary bounds”. The participants in the three fragments associate in non-natural 
“alliance” rather than family resemblance. The juxtaposition of the fragments does not offer 
an overarching explanation or concept that would encompass all three. Nor does it elevate 
one example to a superior position of explaining or solving the other two. It is, rather, an 
assemblage that expresses two of an infinite number of potential “ramifications” of the 
classroom event - the result of sensing something moving in the three events that cannot be 
fully captured or represented, but which allows them to resonate.  
 
I would suggest that the obscure, affective intensity around Hannah’s silence operates as an 
a-signifying trait or aleatory mark that opens a diagrammatic line, introducing catastrophe 
into a number of domains: the order of the classroom, the self-certainty of the participants 
(including the researchers), the rationality of explanation, the power of critique. But in so 
doing the diagram is not only catastrophe but is, in the words of Deleuze (2003: 102) “also a 
germ of order or rhythm.” It is this rhythm, a kind of virtual pulse, that connects the events 
and affords the precursive jump from one to another.  
 
Diagrammatic or divinatory practice demands that we give up our inclination for narrative 
as well as logical coherence (c.f. Deleuze, 2003). Since the usefulness of the diagram consists 
precisely in its power to mobilise that which can only be sensed, and to undermine 
conscious intentions, there would be little point in attempting a research narrative that 
would retrospectively represent how “we” moved/were moved from one event to the next. 
I am unable to describe how, or even when, “Bartleby” and “Hannah” began to resonate, or 
the point at which the Radiohead video became complicit. It is not possible even to identify 
an originary “Hannah event” that would be located in a determinate space and time. The 
catastrophic force of Hanna’s silence is distributed across the multiple occasions of its 
occurrence, on different occasions of taking the register. But perhaps the event that we are 
concerned with happened at the point at which a “fieldnote” was entered in Christina’s 
research notebook? Or when it surfaced as a “hot spot” of our project discussions (MacLure, 
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2013a: 172)? Or even when it first made it into print as the focus of a journal article?  Linear 
time is not really at issue here, since on the virtual plane, the three events are already 
connected as potentials; already participating in one another. The sense that resonates in 
events is, according to Williams (2008: 36) “more like a distant and embodied destiny that 
different events intermittently connect to, feed off and alter for all other events.”  
 
The affective frisson of the classroom event, and the interstitial “jumps” that connect it to 
the other elements in this composition felt, and were, unmotivated. We did not know in 
advance where we were going. But their untimely appearance nevertheless depended on 
preparation – on that apprenticeship to signs described above. The jumps are obscurely 
conditioned by hours of sifting and struggling, on the part of the researchers, with a mass of 
“raw” material in the form of fieldnotes and video recordings – cryptic encounters from 
which other transversal lines might have issued to form other data events. They are also 
inchoately connected, I would suggest, to the ennui of project meetings held loosely 
together by false starts and failed topics listless discarded, in a precursive, affective waiting 
for the irruption of some diagrammatic potential towards an elsewhere that we could not 
have predicted. And finally, those jumps were grounded in our shared concerns, as 
researchers and as educators, with practice, policy and lived experience in the spaces of 
early childhood education, and the implications for those caught up in it. We were 
determined to loosen our focus, or relax our gaze enough to ask better questions, formulate 
better problems or sense new implications. The unanticipated lines of flight that opened up 
were also, always grounded in our collective investment, and involvement, in Hannah’s 
dilemma.   
 
Ultimately, what is glimpsed in the triptych above is apprehended distinctly but obscurely, in 
the mode of the “Dionysian thinker” (Deleuze, 1994: 259): as something that cannot be 
represented but can only be sensed – perhaps something akin to the scent of death that 
lurks in the rage for explanation; the amorphous turmoil stirred by explanation’s inevitable 
tendency to recede; and the price paid by those who inadvertently trigger, but can never 
satisfy, its voracious appetite. These are unquestionably matters of educational and social 
concern.    
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Conclusion 
 
Divination forces us to re-think the ethics and politics of relationality. The unnatural 
relations entertained by divination and the politics of sorcery present a challenge, not only 
to the static relations of representation, but also to theories that posit an unbounded, 
haptic relationality as the originary condition from which individuals and stable structures 
subsequently emerge. Colebrook (2019: 188) detects a colonial violence in the 
“fetishisation" of all-embracing relationality, as espoused in disparate domains including 
theories of emergence, post-Kantian philosophy, and relational aesthetics. The appeal to an 
encompassing relationality has further intensified, Colebrook notes, with the installation of 
the Anthropocene as a looming planetary disaster that is both the fault and the fate of an 
undifferentiated “humanity” (see also Yusoff, 2018).  The privileging of relationality, 
Colebrook argues, inevitably suppresses the intransigent alterity of indigenous and nomadic 
societies, for whom recuperation into the global family will always mean erasure or 
exploitation. She argues for a decolonising relationality of incommensurability - of 
indifference to the settler demand for empathic relation to the globe (see also Jones & 
Jenkins, 2008). This would involve “a radical cut or refusal of relationality” at least in its 
hegemonic forms (2019: 185).5 Colebrook discerns such a radically non-relational politics 
and counter-ethics in the work of Deleuze and Guattari.   
 
Divination has the potential to effect a similar decolonisation of research methodology. 
There is a politics of divination in the diagrammatic line that forges relations of 
“incommensurable simultaneity,” to use Colebrook’s (2019: 191) words. In the 
diagrammatic composition, entities persist in their implacable separateness, resisting 
assimilation into larger schemes, but nevertheless gesture towards some fragile resonance. 
In the case of the data triptych above, this enabled my colleagues and I to think about the 
colonial violence that might inhere in the impulse to render others visible and 
comprehensible. It allowed us to suspend the inclination to contain analysis within 
generalising frames that allow us only to ‘see’ encounters between adults and children, or 
teachers and students. It may have altered, if only slightly, our assumptions about who and 
what are involved in educational events.  I like to imagine that it has contributed, in diffuse 
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and obscure ways, to a rethinking that is still continuing, about the kinds of relations that 
we want to form with children; and those that we might work to avoid.   
 
Divinatory practices would, in summary, be diagrammatic, ambulant, cryptic and 
experimental. They would be affirmative: not looking for blame, but proliferating 
connection. They would engage the queer temporality and spatiality of the Event, and 
entertain forms of relation and participation that are always to some extent inhuman. I do 
not propose that inquiry should necessarily abandon the search for order and regularity, 
according to conventional logics of representation, discourse etc. But I have suggested that 
it is also possible to unfold something “inside” conventional inquiry – something that 
already inhabits its interstices - that would open it to unanticipated connections through the 
working of chance. In the esoteric practices that have been explored here, we might find 
what immanent inquiry needs to escape its thrall to hierarchy, transcendence and the 
sovereign will of the interpreter. At the very end of her monumental book, Thinking with 
Whitehead, Isabelle Stengers credits Whitehead with developing a mode of “empirical 
experimentation-verification that is akin to trance, because in it thought is taken, captured, 
by a becoming that separates it from its own intentionality” (2011: 519; emphasis added). 
This description also provides an apt condensation of inquiry as divination, and a fitting note 
on which to end. 
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Notes 
 
1 Authors would include Deleuze, (1994; 2003; 2004); Deleuze & Guattari (1983; 1987); 
Stengers (2008); Ramey (2012); Semetsky (2011); Gangle (2015); Pisters (2006); Grosz 
(2017); Blake (2014). 
2 MacLure (2017) critically explores the significance of Dionysus as a figure for “post 
qualitative” research.   
3 “Fabrication” is Stengers’ (2008) term of choice for the clinical practice of witchcraft. 
4 This renewed encounter with “old” data itself replays the dynamic of divination that I am 
trying to unfold, without being able fully to represent it. It can be understood as an attempt 
to explicate something implicated.    
5 Colebrook (2019: 185) is referring here to Deleuze, and argues that this radical cut in 
relationality is “only hinted at” in his work, in comparison with the more visible emphasis on 
the unbounded cosmic relationality opened by “higher deterritorialization”. My argument 
would be that this “hint” is much stronger than she allows.   
